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Locomotion in Social Dilemmas: How People Adapt to Cooperative,
Tit-for-Tat, and Noncooperative Partners
Paul A. M. Van Lange and Kitty Visser
Free University, Amsterdam
The authors address locomotion in social dilemmas, examining the influence of social value orientation
(prosocial, individualistic, and competitive orientations) and partner's strategy (100% cooperation, tit for
tat, and 100% noncooperation) on cooperative behavior and locomotion to enhanced or reduced levels of
interdependence (tendencies toward approach vs. avoidance). Extending prior research on behavioral
assimilation (e.g., H. H. Kelley & A. J. Stahelski, 1970), results revealed that a noncooperative partner
elicited not only relatively low levels of cooperation but also locomotions to low interdependence. Also,
relative to prosocials and individualists, competitors exhibited low levels of cooperation and locomotions
to low interdependence with a tit-for-tat partner. This underscores the functionality of tit for tat, in that
it moves away those who seek relative advantage, thus minimizing the costs following from noncoop-
erative interactions.
Generally, interactions tend to be pleasant with others who take
our interests into account and behave in a cooperative manner.
However, every now and then, one interacts with others who
pursue their self-interest at the expense of one's own interest and
the collective interest. How do people respond to others who act in
a selfish or noncooperative manner? Are they likely to act selfishly
in turn? Are they likely to move away from this other, thereby
seeking to become less dependent on this other person? Or both?
Although there are more than two routes that one can take, the
large literature of cooperation and competition suggests the former
answer. Even if individuals are quite generous and considerate
themselves, they are likely to "behaviorally assimilate" or "recip-
rocate" noncooperative behavior, especially if the other repeatedly
engages in noncooperative behavior (e.g., Kelley & Stahelski,
1970; Komorita, Hilty, & Parks, 1991). Clearly, behavioral assim-
ilation and reciprocity are important phenomena, providing a plau-
sible explanation for interaction patterns that are often labeled as
mutual noncooperation, DD lock-in effects, and escalation of
conflict (e.g., Komorita & Parks, 1995; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977).
At the same time, we suggest that tendencies toward behavioral
assimilation and reciprocity provide only part of the answer. In
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many situations, individuals are not slaves to their circumstances
but are able to alter the situation in ways that allow them to pursue
their goals in a more effective manner. Indeed, the second answer
is also quite plausible. One might, in fact, seek to move away from
noncooperative others, thereby becoming less dependent on the
other's actions (and frequently, with the other becoming less
dependent on one's actions). One might assume that social inter-
actions in everyday life are often guided by movement to varying
levels of interdependence. For example, people are likely to ap-
preciate and seek out joint activities with others with whom they
have had pleasant interaction experiences; yet they may seek to
avoid those with whom they have had less pleasant interaction
experiences. Presumably, interactions with close partners, friends,
colleagues, neighbors, and business partners are shaped by such
behaviors. Although it is often very difficult to become entirely
independent of such others (e.g., a colleague or neighbor cannot be
completely avoided, unless one moves to a different job or place),
people often do have an option to vary the level of interdependence
with such others. Examples are the degree to which one engages in
joint activities, such as collaborative projects or social events, or
the degree of attention and interest one conveys with respect to
interacting with others. Notably, behaviors that are linked to in-
terpersonal approach versus avoidance have received very little
attention in the literature of cooperation and competition. Indeed,
this literature has focused primarily on the determinants of coop-
erative and competitive behavior within one particular situation, in
the absence of possibilities to change features of that situation.
Locomotion
Behavior through which actors change features of a situation
may be referred to as locomotion. More specifically, locomotion
may be defined as goal-directed activity causing change in the
interdependence structure underlying an interaction situation (or
patterns of interaction situations) involving two or more individ-
uals. This definition is based on Lewin's (1935) original definition
762
LOCOMOTION IN SOCIAL DILEMMAS 763
of locomotion and on subsequent definitions of locomotion, which
stress "goal-directed activity" and "sequence of actions" (Cart-
wright & Zander, 1953, pp. 401-402), as well as on more con-
temporary theory of interdependence and transition lists (Kelley,
1984, 1997; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). In the current definition,
goal-directed activity involves one action (or a sequence of ac-
tions) by one or multiple individuals, which unilaterally or jointly
determines features of situations to which one or multiple individ-
uals move (cf. Cartwright & Zander, 1953). The concept of inter-
dependence structure may involve fundamental properties of in-
terdependence (e.g., degree and mutuality of dependence, the
degree to which outcomes conflict vs. correspond; Kelley &
Thibaut, 1978) as well as differences in the sequence and timing of
future actions (e.g., the decision to make a preemptive move, the
decision to delay future interaction situations; cf. Kelley, 1984,
1997; Van Lange, 1994).
Locomotion is a useful concept because it emphasizes not only
change or movement from one situation (or location) to another
but also the distinction between means and ends, thus focusing on
the interpersonal routes one can take in relation to the goals one
seeks to accomplish (cf. paths and forces; Lewin, 1935, 1936/
1966). Our focus on locomotion is also importantly inspired by
Kelley's (1984, 1997) transition list approach to interdependence,
which seeks to overcome the "static" use of outcome matrices by
providing a conceptual framework for bringing to researchers'
attention not only outcome-relevant actions but also actions that
bring the individual, the dyad, or the larger group to new situa-
tions. By virtue of locomotions or transitions from one situation to
another, this analysis helps conceptualize a broader behavioral
repertoire within the interdependence framework, including not
only cooperative and competitive tendencies but also other
interaction-relevant tendencies, such as dominance versus submis-
sion, activity versus passivity, and approach versus avoidance (cf.
Van Lange, 1997). Such tendencies are in fact part of how indi-
viduals tend to evaluate the self and others as interdependent actors
(e.g., evaluation, potency, and activity; Osgood, Suci, & Tannen-
baum, 1957; circumplex models; cf. Wiggins, 1979).
There are at least two complementary reasons that locomotion is
important. First, locomotion calls attention to how individuals'
goals and motivations are reflected in situation selection, thereby
complementing extant research and theory that tend to focus on
how situations affect responses (such as cooperation and compe-
tition) rather than actions aimed at changing features of a situation
(see also Snyder & Ickes, 1985). Second, research using the
outcome matrix (e.g., the prisoner's dilemma) has been criticized
primarily for its limited ecological validity, a limitation that, at
least partially, derives from the static use of outcome matrices (cf.
Nemeth, 1972; Pruitt & Kimmel, 1977). As noted earlier, interde-
pendent actors in real life are often provided with a broader
behavioral repertoire, including actions aimed at approaching or
avoiding particular others. Accordingly, extending the behavioral
repertoire potentially serves the degree to which one captures
behaviors that are relevant to understanding social interaction in
real life, thus providing an enhanced basis for strengthening the
ecological validity of the experimental game and related method-
ology. For example, preferences for structural change in social
dilemmas (cf. Messick et al., 1983; Samuelson, Messick, Rutte, &
Wilke, 1984; Van Vugt, 1997), withdrawal choices in prisoner's
dilemmas (e.g., Miller & Holmes, 1975; Schopler & Insko, 1992;
Yamagishi, 1988), selection of alternative partners (Dawes &
Orbell, 1992; Yamagishi, Hayashi, & Jin, 1994), or exclusion of
particular others in small groups (Kerr, in press) can be viewed in
terms of locomotion (i.e., such choices cause change in the inter-
dependence underlying an interaction situation) and help enhance
the ecological validity of the experimental gaming paradigm.
The Present Research
The present study used an iterated social dilemma task, charac-
terized by the conflict between the pursuit of personal well-being
versus collective well-being. Using a new paradigm, the present
research addresses outcome-relevant behavior (i.e., cooperation vs.
noncooperation) and locomotion to varying levels of interdepen-
dence underlying social dilemmas. Locomotion was assessed by
examining participants' choices among one of five social dilem-
mas that systematically differed in levels of fate control (i.e.,
unilateral control of partner's actions on one's own outcomes)
relative to reflexive control (i.e., unilateral control of an individ-
ual's actions on one's own outcomes).1
The major purpose of the present research was threefold. First,
we examined individuals' cooperation and locomotions to varying
levels of interdependence in response to three classic strategies
pursued by the partner: (a) an unconditionally cooperative strategy,
(b) a tit-for-tat strategy (i.e., a conditionally cooperative strategy,
which commences a cooperative choice and subsequently imitates
the previous choice of the partner), and (c) an unconditionally
noncooperative strategy. We also examined the effects of partner's
locomotions, manipulating the degree to which the partner moved
to high versus low levels of interdependence. Second, we exam-
ined whether and how individuals' own interaction goals (i.e.,
prosocial, individualistic, or competitive orientations) affected
their choices and locomotions in response to a cooperative partner,
a tit-for-tat partner, and a noncooperative partner. Third, we ex-
amined the functioning of participants and the collective, assessing
the quality of outcomes the participant obtained (i.e., participant's
outcomes) and the dyad obtained (i.e., collective outcomes) across
interactions.
The Role of Partner's Strategy in Static Social Dilemmas
A long tradition of research has revealed that cooperation is
importantly shaped by the strategy pursued by the interdependent
partner. The consistent finding is that the tit-for-tat strategy elicits
greater cooperation than an unconditionally cooperative strategy
(i.e., 100% cooperation), which in turn elicits greater cooperation
than an unconditionally noncooperative strategy (100% noncoop-
1 Our choice to study locomotion in the realm of reducing versus
enhancing interdependence was further guided by two broad consider-
ations. First, dependence—and in its mutual form, interdependence—is one
of the primary features of the taxonomy of situations provided by interde-
pendence theory (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). Second, locomotion regarding
the degree of interdependence does capture tendencies toward approach
and avoidance, which were given a central meaning in classic theories of
group dynamics and personality development {e.g., attachment theory,
social learning theory).
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eration; for a classic review, see Oskamp, 1971). Moreover, Ax-
elrod's (1984) tournament studies as well as more recent research
(e.g., Komorita et al., 1991) provide strong evidence in support of
the claim that tit for tat is among the most effective strategies in
eliciting cooperation.
Does tit for tat elicit cooperation among all individuals'? Re-
search of Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) examined simulta-
neously the role of the strategy pursued by the partner and indi-
viduals' social value orientation. Specifically, they examined
differences among three types of social value orientation: (a)
prosocial orientation (i.e., maximization of outcomes for both self
and others and minimization of differences between outcomes for
self and others), (b) individualistic orientation (i.e., maximization
of one's own outcomes with little or no regard for outcomes for
others), and (c) competitive orientation (i.e., maximization of rel-
ative advantage over others; these definitions are based on evi-
dence reported in Van Lange, 1999). Kuhlman and Marshello were
able to demonstrate that (a) prosocials exhibited cooperation with
cooperative and tit-for-tat partners yet turned to noncooperation
with noncooperative partners; (b) individualists exhibited high
cooperation with partners pursuing tit for tat, substantially lower
cooperation with cooperative partners, and no cooperation with
noncooperative partners; and (c) competitors did not exhibit co-
operation with any of these interaction partners (for related evi-
dence, see McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Sattler & Kerr, 1991).
Such evidence suggests that the effectiveness of tit-for-tat can be
understood because it allows for (a) the pursuit of collective
outcomes and desire for equality of outcomes, thereby motivating
prosocials to cooperate, and (b) the pursuit of long-term personal
outcomes, thereby motivating individualists to cooperate. The gen-
eral absence of cooperative behavior among competitors can be
understood because relative advantage over the partner's outcomes
cannot be served by engaging in cooperative behavior.
From Static Social Dilemmas to Locomotion in
Social Dilemmas
The findings by Kuhlman and Marshello (1975) rely on rela-
tively static social dilemmas, in which both the individual and the
partner can pursue their interaction goals only through making
cooperative or noncooperative choices. What are the psychological
implications of a more dynamic situation in which both the indi-
vidual and the partner can also locomote to reduced versus en-
hanced levels of interdependence? We outline two implications.
The first implication derives from the partner's ability to move to
reduced versus enhanced levels of interdependence. The second
implication derives from the individual's ability to move to re-
duced versus enhanced levels of interdependence.
First, the static social dilemma is characterized by outcome
control, through which individuals provide good or bad outcomes
for the partner. A more dynamic social dilemma, as studied pres-
ently, is also characterized by locomotion, allowing the partner
(and the individual himself or herself) to determine the level of
interdependence underlying future interaction situations. The com-
bination of outcome control (through cooperative and noncooper-
ative choices) and locomotion (through movement to varying
levels of interdependence) provides a partner with a fair amount of
power over the individual (and vice versa; cf. Thibaut & Kelley,
1959). Locomotion to high (versus low) interdependence increases
the impact a partner has on an individual's outcomes, with coop-
erative choices yielding very good outcomes for the individual and
noncooperative choices yielding very bad outcomes for the indi-
vidual. Thus, the partner's availability to move the individual
(along with the partner himself or herself) to situations varying in
level of interdependence might explain why people who are pri-
marily or exclusively interested in enhancing outcomes for self
(i.e., individualists) tend to behave quite cooperatively with a
cooperative partner in a more dynamic social dilemma. Competi-
tors do not tend to behave cooperatively in response to cooperative
partners (Van Lange, 1994; for a related finding, see Van Lange,
Agnew, Harinck, & Steemers, 1997). Thus, we anticipated repli-
cating the findings of Kuhlman and Marshello (1975), with the
exception that we expected a cooperative partner to elicit fairly
high levels of cooperation in both prosocials and individualists.
Second, the possibility of locomotion to varying levels of inter-
dependence allows for tendencies toward interpersonal approach
versus interpersonal avoidance. When individuals can accomplish
(or anticipate they can accomplish) their primary interaction goals
with an interaction partner (i.e., anticipation of goal success), they
should want to move to enhanced levels of interdependence with
this partner. For example, if an individual is interested in enhanc-
ing joint outcomes and equality in outcomes and the partner's
strategy permits the attainment of these interaction goals (e.g., a
partner pursuing cooperation or tit for tat), then this individual
should wish to move to enhanced levels of interdependence. In
contrast, when individuals cannot accomplish (or anticipate they
cannot accomplish) their primary interaction goals (i.e., anticipa-
tion of goal failure), then they should want to move to reduced
levels of interdependence. For example, if an individual is inter-
ested in enhancing joint outcomes and equality in outcomes, and
the partner's strategy does not permit the attainment of these
interaction goals (i.e., the partner is a noncooperative partner), then
this individual should wish to move to reduced levels of
interdependence.
A Framework for Understanding Cooperation,
Locomotion, and Functioning
Table 1 represents a framework that outlines the probable
choices (cooperation vs. noncooperation), goal experiences (suc-
cess vs. failure), and locomotion (to enhance vs. to reduce inter-
dependence), as well as the functioning of the individual himself or
herself (i.e., the quality of participant's outcomes) and the joint
functioning of the participant and the partner (i.e., the quality of
collective outcomes).2 What hypotheses might be derived from
this framework?
2 It should be clear that anticipation of interaction goal attainment
(success vs. failure), as summarized by the concept of goal experience, is
an important theoretical construct in our framework (see Table 1). How-
ever, we did not include measures to assess goal experiences, because (a)
we did not want to interrupt participants' interactions, and (b) we did not
want to enhance "awareness" regarding a link between "anticipated goal
experiences" and locomotion (or cooperation). Also, given that the design
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Table 1
A Framework for Understanding Responses of Prosocials, Individualists, and Competitors to





































































With respect to cooperation, we expected a main effect of
partner's strategy, such that relative to a noncooperative partner,
cooperative and tit-for-tat partners would elicit greater cooperation
(Hypothesis 1). Further, although a main effect for social value
orientation is plausible (with prosocials and individualists exhib-
iting greater cooperation overall than competitors), we expected
the magnitude of the differences between prosocials and individ-
ualists versus competitors to depend on partner's strategy. As can
be inferred from Table 1, the more important prediction is that we
anticipated the differences between prosocials and individualists
versus competitors to be more pronounced for a cooperative part-
ner and a tit-for-tat partner than for a noncooperative partner.
Thus, we expected that, relative to competitors, prosocials and
individualists would exhibit greater levels of cooperation with a
cooperative partner and a tit-for-tat partner, whereas such differ-
ences would be less pronounced when interacting with a nonco-
operative partner (Hypothesis 2).
With respect to locomotion, our framework assumes that indi-
viduals tend to locomote to enhanced levels of interdependence if
they anticipate accomplishing their primary interaction goals (such
as enhancement of joint outcomes along with equality in outcomes,
enhancement of own outcomes, and enhancement of relative ad-
vantage) and locomote to reduced levels of interdependence if they
anticipate not accomplishing their primary interaction goals.
Clearly, a noncooperative partner restrains possibilities for enhanc-
ing joint outcomes along with equality in outcomes, enhancing
already involves three independent variables, we did not directly compare
the present conditions to conditions that do not include a locomotion
option. Instead, we compared the present results to the consistent patterns
of results obtained in previous research that did not include a locomotion
option (e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; McClintock & Liebrand, 1988;
Sattler & Ken-, 1991).
outcomes for self, and relative outcomes. These goals can be more
successfully attained with a cooperative partner and a tit-for-tat
partner (except for pursuing relative outcomes during interaction;
see Table 1). Thus, we predicted a main effect of partner's strat-
egy, such that, relative to noncooperative partners, cooperative and
tit-for-tat partners would elicit locomotion to greater levels of
interdependence; moreover, a cooperative partner is likely to elicit
locomotions to somewhat greater levels of interdependence than a
tit-for-tat partner (Hypothesis 3).
Further, although a main effect for social value orientation is
plausible (with prosocials and individualists exhibiting locomo-
tions to greater levels of interdependence than competitors), we
expected the magnitude of the differences between prosocials and
individualists versus competitors to depend on partner's strategy.
As can be inferred from Table 1, the more important prediction is
that we anticipated the differences between prosocials and indi-
vidualists versus competitors to be more pronounced for a tit-for-
tat partner than for a cooperative partner or a noncooperative
partner. The reasoning is that prosocials (concerned with joint
outcomes and equality in outcomes), individualists (concerned
with own outcomes), and competitors (concerned with relative
advantage) can accomplish their primary interaction goals when
interacting with cooperative partners but cannot accomplish their
primary interaction goals when interacting with a noncooperative
partner. Thus, for these two partners, differences between proso-
cial, individualistic, and competitive participants should be small,
if present at all. In contrast, when interacting with a tit-for-tat
partner, both prosocial and individualistic participants can accom-
plish their primary interaction goals, but competitive participants
cannot (i.e., one cannot effectively accomplish relative advantage
with a tit-for-tat partner, because tit for tat imitates the previous
choice). Therefore, we expected that, relative to prosocials and
individualists, competitors would move to lower levels of interde-
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pendence particularly when interacting with a tit-for-tat partner;
such differences should be less pronounced (if present at all) when
interacting with a cooperative partner or a noncooperative partner
(Hypothesis 4).
With respect to functioning, Table 1 outlines how partner's strategy
and individuals' social value orientations should impact participants'
functioning (i.e., participant's outcomes) and collective functioning
(i.e., collective outcomes). Both types of functioning, as noted earlier,
should be determined by both level of cooperation and level of
interdependence. A tit-for-tat partner was expected to elicit high levels
of cooperation and high levels of interdependence among prosocials
and individualists, but low levels of cooperation and low levels of
interdependence among competitors. In contrast, when interacting
with a noncooperative partner, prosocials, individualists, and compet-
itors were expected to exhibit low levels of cooperation and locomo-
tion to reduced interdependence. When interacting with a cooperative
partner, prosocials and individualists were expected to exhibit high
levels of cooperation and locomotion to high interdependence (a
pattern yielding good outcomes for self and the collective), whereas
competitors were expected to exhibit relatively low levels of cooper-
ation and high interdependence (a pattern yielding very good out-
comes for self, and fairly good outcomes for the collective, although
distributed unequally). Taken together, the primary hypotheses were
that, relative to competitors, prosocials and individualists would ob-
tain greater outcomes for self (Hypothesis 5) and greater collective
outcomes (Hypothesis 6) when interacting with a tit-for-tat partner,
and that such differences between competitors versus prosocials and
individualists would be substantially smaller when interacting with a
cooperative partner or a noncooperative partner.
As noted earlier, we examined the effects of partner's locomo-
tions to either high or low levels of interdependence. This variable
was included because it allows for a situation of symmetry in
which both the participant and the partner are able to locomote to
different levels of interdependence. Also, although one might
advance several specific hypotheses (e.g., partner's locomotions
might amplify the effects of partner's strategy, such that cooper-
ative and tit-for-tat partners elicit greater cooperation when mov-
ing to high rather than low interdependence, whereas the reverse
might be found for noncooperative partners), we advanced no
formal hypotheses for this variable.
Method
Participants and Experimental Design
One hundred eighty participants (77 men, 102 women, and 1 participant
whose gender was unidentified) with an average age of 23 years took part
in this study. They were recruited by means of an advertisement in the
university paper. Each participant was paid 15 Dutch Guilders (approxi-
mately $8). The experimental design included two between-subjects vari-
ables and two within-subject variables. The between-subjects variables
were social value orientation (prosocial vs. individualistic vs. competitive)
and partner's locomotion (low vs. high interdependence), and the within-
subject variables were partner's strategy (cooperative vs. tit for tat vs.
noncooperative) and blocks of trials, fo be discussed shortly. The primary
dependent measures were the number of cooperative choices per block and
locomotion to varying levels of interdependence.
Procedure
Six to 8 participants attended each research session. On arrival, each
participant was greeted and escorted to one of eight cubicles, preventing
participants from communicating with each other. The entire experiment
was computerized. At the end of the research session, participants were
thanked for their participation, debriefed, and paid.
Measuring social value orientation. Each participant's social value
orientation was determined by his or her responses to a series of nine
decomposed games, which involve making choices between specific com-
binations of outcomes for oneself and for a (hypothetical) other (Messick
& McClintock, 1968). Outcomes were presented in terms of points, and
participants were asked to imagine that the points had value to themselves
as well as to the other person. Each decomposed game provided partici-
pants with a choice among three alternatives, one corresponding to each of
the three social value orientations (for extended instructions regarding the
nine-item decomposed game measure, see Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, &
Joireman, 1997). An example is the choice among A: 480 points for self
and 80 points for other, B: 540 points for self and 280 points for other, and
C: 480 points for self and 480 points for other. In this example, Choice A
represents the competitive option, because it yields the largest difference
between one's own and the other's outcomes, Choice B represents the
individualistic option because it yields the largest outcomes for self, and
Choice C represents the prosocial option because it yields the largest joint
outcomes and the smallest discrepancy between outcomes for self and the
other. As in previous research (e.g., McClintock & Allison, 1989; Van
Lange & Kuhlman, 1994), participants were classified into one of the three
categories of social value orientation if they made at least six of the nine
choices consistent with that category. We identified 66 prosocial partici-
pants, 42 individualists, and 33 competitors. Thirty-nine participants made
fewer than six consistent choices and were omitted. As in previous research
using similar sample sizes (e.g., McClintock & Liebrand, 1988; Van Lange
& Kuhlman, 1994), social value orientation was not significantly associ-
ated with gender, ^ ( 2 , N = 141) = 2.14, ns.
The experimental task. The instructions for the experimental task be-
gan by explaining five different social dilemmas presented as Matrices 1
through 5 in Table 2. The social dilemma features were explained using
Table 2
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Matrix 3, representing an average level of interdependence. Individual
rationality was illustrated by explaining that "compared to one's own
choice for Alternative A, a choice for Alternative B results in a 32-point
greater outcome for self, irrespective of the other's choice." Collective
rationality was illustrated by stating that "when both you and the other
choose A, each of your outcomes will be an 18 point gain; yet, when both
you and the other choose B, each of your outcomes will be an 18 point
loss." Participants were also told that "the other's choice for Alternative B
will always yield losses for self and that "the other's choice for Alterna-
tive A will always yield gains for self."
The differing levels of interdependence underlying the five social di-
lemmas represent (a) the extent to which the partner's choice of A results
in greater outcomes to self than the partner's choice of B, irrespective of
one's own choice (i.e., a main effect for partner's choice, or fate control;
cf. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978), and (b) the extent to which one's own choice
of B results in greater outcomes for self than one's own choice of A,
irrespective of the other's choice (i.e., a main effect for own choice, or
reflexive control; cf. Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). As can be seen in Table 2,
the degree of fate control systematically increases from Matrices 1 to 5
(i.e., fate control was 52, 60, 68, 76, and 84, respectively), whereas the
degree of reflexive control systematically decreases from Matrices 1 to 5
(i.e., reflexive control was 48, 40, 32, 24, and 16). Put differently, the
impact of partner's choices on an individual's outcomes increased by 8
points per matrix from Matrix 1 to Matrix 5, whereas the impact of an
individual's own choices on one's outcomes decreased by 8 points per
matrix from Matrix 1 to Matrix 5. Thus, the ratio of reflexive control to fate
control systematically varied across the five situations, from 48:52
(or 92.3%) in Situation 1 to 16:84 (or 19.0%) in Situation 5.'
Although the experimental task focused on points, we sought to increase
the value of points by noting that they would increase the odds of receiving
a 25-Guilder book certificate (i.e., a gift certificate for buying books at any
bookstore in the Netherlands) as they accumulated a greater number of
points. That is, we stated that the number of points accumulated for
themselves corresponded to a number of tickets in a raffle for the book
certificates, making clear that their chances would increase by the number
of points they accumulated for themselves, not by the number of points
they accumulated more than others (i.e., we used an absolute standard, and
the number of certificates was not fixed). After the experiment, we held a
raffle and five 25-Guilder book certificates were awarded. (In the actual
raffle, each participant had an equal chance of winning the book certificate,
because participants in the condition in which the partner locomoted to
high [vs. IowJ interdependence had a greater chance of accumulating a
large number of points.)
A 10-item comprehension check of instructions for the social dilemma
task revealed good comprehension (i.e., 9 of 10 questions were correctly
answered, on average). However, there were 8 participants (including 6
participants who were classifiable in terms of their dominant social value
orientations) who answered fewer than six questions correctly. The data of
these participants were discarded, leaving a total of 135 participants,
including 65 prosocial individuals, 39 individualists, and 31 competitors.
Manipulation of partner's strategy. A cooperative partner was pro-
grammed to make a cooperative choice at each trial, a noncooperative
partner was programmed to make a noncooperative choice at each trial, and
a tit-for-tat partner was programmed to begin by making a cooperative
choice and then to make the choice that the participant had made in the
previous trial. The three preprogrammed strategies were administered in
six different orders (i.e., examining all possible orders). For both cooper-
ation and locomotion to varying leyels of interdependence, we included
order in the analyses but found no significant main or interaction effects.
Thus, this variable is not discussed further.
Manipulation of partner's locomotions. The participant and the pre-
programmed partner took turns in choosing a matrix (from the five differ-
ent matrices) that would then be used for making cooperative or nonco-
Table 3
The Procedure for Making Cooperative and Noncooperative
Choices and Selections of Matrices in Which to Make

























































































































Note. A = cooperation; B = noncooperation.
operative choices. A partner locomoting to high interdependence was
programmed to consistently select Matrix 5 (high interdependence condi-
tion), and a partner locomoting to low interdependence was programmed to
consistently select Matrix 1 (low interdependence condition). More details
regarding the procedure follow in the next paragraphs.
Measurement of cooperation and locomotion. The experimental task
consisted of nine sets of two choices (for an overview, see Table 3). The first
set, involving two trials, was administered prior to the participant's receiving
information regarding the other's cooperative behavior or the other's locomo-
tion to low or high interdependence. That is, for these two trials, the experi-
menter determined the level of interdependence, which was always Matrix 3,
representing an average level of interdependence. The second set of two trials
(i.e., Trials 3 and 4) were administered after the participant had chosen a matrix
(i.e., Matrix 1, 2, 3,4, or 5) to assess participants' locomotion to varying levels
of interdependence. Similarly, prior to the fourth set (Trials 7 and 8), sixth set
3 The five matrices did not differ in terms of two features that might
affect cooperation and locomotions. First, the Grand Mean, or the average
of all four possible outcomes, equals zero in all five matrices. Second, we
wanted the best possible outcome (50) and worst possible outcome (-50)
to be equal for all five matrices, so that the matrices would not differ in
terms of risk (which would obtain if there were variations in the worst
possible outcome) and opportunity (which would obtain if there were
variations in the best possible outcome; cf. Van Lange, 1994). We should
also note that fate control should always be equal to or greater than
reflexive control in order to match the features of a social dilemma.
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(Trials 11 and 12), and eighth set (Trials 15 and 16), we assessed participants'
locomotion. (In the analyses of locomotion to be discussed, the scores for
locomotion represent the number of the matrix that participants selected.) Prior
to the third set (Trials 5 and 6), fifth set (Trials 9 and 10), seventh set (Trials 13
and 14), and ninth set (Trials 17 and 18), participants received information
about the partner's locomotion to either low interdependence (i.e., the partner
consistently selected Matrix 1) or high interdependence (i.e., the partner
consistently selected Matrix 5). Thus, as can be seen in Table 3, the experi-
menter determined the matrix for the first two trials, after which the participant
and the partner took turns in determining the matrix for each subsequent set of
two trials. Participants received information regarding the partner's choice
(cooperation vs. noncooperation) after each trial and received information
regarding the partner's locomotion before each new set of two trials (i.e.,
before Sets 3, 5, 7, and 9). Also, participants were led to believe that their
partners were selected from among those other participants who were present
in the session.4
Table 4
Mean Number of Cooperative Choices and Mean
Interdependence Locomotion as a Function of Own
Social Value Orientation and Partner's Strategy
Results
Cooperative Behavior
As noted earlier, the social dilemma task involved nine sets of
trials, each consisting of two choices (i.e., 18 trials). The first two
choices were made prior to receiving information regarding the
partner's cooperative behavior or the partner's interdependence
choice. The remaining 16 trials were analyzed in four blocks of
four trials, so as to analyze cooperative behavior in comparable
blocks (i.e., two choices were made in an interdependence situa-
tion determined by self, and two choices were made in an inter-
dependence situation determined by the partner). Thus, for each of
the four blocks, the number of cooperative choices could vary from
zero to four.
The number of the cooperative choices in each block was
analyzed in a 3 (social value orientation: prosocial vs. individual-
istic vs. competitive) by 3 (partner's strategy: cooperative vs. tit
for tat vs. noncooperative) by 2 (partner's locomotion: high vs. low
interdependence) by 4 (blocks of trials: Blocks 1 through 4)
analysis of variance (ANOVA), with partner's strategy and blocks
of trials being within-subject variables. First, consistent with Hy-
pothesis I, this analysis yielded a main effect for partner's strat-
egy, F(2, 129) = 89.46, p < .001, revealing that a cooperative
partner and a tit-for-tat partner elicited greater cooperation than a
noncooperative partner (see Table 4). Planned comparisons re-
vealed a significant contrast of cooperative and tit-for-tat partners
versus noncooperative partner, F(l, 129) = 173.47, p < .001. The
other orthogonal contrast of cooperative partner versus tit-for-tat
partner was also significant, F(l, 129) = 15.63, p < .001, indi-
cating that a cooperative partner elicited greater cooperation than
a tit-for-tat partner.5
Second, a main effect of social value orientation, F(2,
129) = 4.67, p < .05, revealed that prosocials and individualists
exhibited greater cooperation than did competitive participants
(see Table 4). Planned comparisons revealed a significant contrast
of prosocial participants and individualists versus competitors,
F(l, 129) = 9.31,/» < .01, and no significant contrast of prosocials
versus individualists, F(l, 129) - 0.03, ns.
Third, the analysis revealed a significant interaction of partner's
strategy and social value orientation, F(4, 258) = 3.95, p < .005.
Differences between the mean levels of cooperation by prosocials








































competitive participants were quite substantial for a tit-for-tat
partner (M = 2.69 vs. M = 1.68, a mean difference of 1.01),
intermediate for a cooperative partner (M = 2.82 vs. M = 2.30, a
mean difference of 0.52), and relatively weak for a noncooperative
partner (M = 0.93 vs. M = 0.64, a mean difference of 0.29; see
also Table 4). Planned comparisons revealed (a) a marginal inter-
action of the competitive versus prosocial-individualistic orienta-
tion contrast with the cooperative/tit-for-tat versus noncooperative
partner contrast, F(l, 129) = 3.12, p < .10, and (b) an interaction
of the competitive versus prosocial-individualistic orientation con-
trast with the cooperative-partner versus tit-for-tat partner contrast,
F(l, 129) = 9.34, p < .01. The latter effect indicates that it is
especially the tit-for-tat partner, rather than the cooperative part-
ner, who elicits strong differences between prosocial and individ-
4 It is possible that participants perceived their selections of matrices
simply in terms of choosing among different reward structures (i.e., dif-
ferent sets of numerical outcomes) and not necessarily in terms of loco-
moting to varying levels of interdependence. Theoretically, the matrix
selections involve locomotion, given its definition (i.e., goal-directed ac-
tivity causing change in the interdependence structure underlying an inter-
action situation . . . ; cf. Lewin, 1935, 1936/1966). We acknowledge that
locomotion is a broad concept, which in our view includes the selection of
different reward structures, particularly if differences in reward structure
represent meaningful differences in interdependence structure (e.g., level
of interdependence, the degree to which own and partner's interests con-
flict, or correspondence of outcomes; Kelley & Thibaut, 1978). We should
also acknowledge that the locomotion option might be more strongly
experienced as such, when participants, for example, were asked to make
a choice of whether to work with the other on different tasks differing in
level of interdependence (i.e., no "game" situations).
5 This finding is inconsistent with previous research, in which locomo-
tion to varying levels of interdependence by either the self or the partner
was not possible (e.g., Kuhlman & Marshello, 1975; Oskamp, 1971). As
noted earlier, we suggest that the availability of locomotion provides the
partner with some power, which may have motivated several individuals to
exhibit cooperation in response to a cooperative partner.
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ualistic versus competitive participants. Generally, these findings
are consistent with Hypothesis 2 (i.e., predicting that differences
between prosocial and individualistic vs. competitive participants
were overall more pronounced for a tit-for-tat partner and coop-
erative partners, rather than for noncooperative partners), except
that the differences between competitive versus prosocial and
individualistic participants were not extremely large for a cooper-
ative partner.6
Locomotion to Varying Levels of Interdependence
Locomotions to varying levels of interdependence were as-
sessed by the participant's selections of Matrices 1 to 5. These
locomotions were analyzed in a 3 (social value orientation) by 3
(partner's strategy) by 2 (partner's locomotion) by 4 (blocks of
trials) ANOVA, with partner's strategy and blocks of trials being
within-subject variables. First, this analysis yielded a significant
main effect for partner's strategy, F(2, 128) = 36.02, p < .001,
revealing locomotion to greater levels of interdependence with
a cooperative partner (M = 4.17) and tit-for-tat partner (M = 4.04)
than with a noncooperative partner (M = 2.89). Consistent with
Hypothesis 3, planned comparisons revealed a significant con-
trast of cooperative and tit-for-tat partners versus noncooperative
partners, F(l, 129) = 71.01, p < .001; the other contrast in-
volving cooperative versus tit-for-tat partners was marginal, F(\,
129) = 3.53, p< .10.
Second, the analysis revealed a significant interaction of
social value orientation and partner's strategy, F{A, 258) = 2.82,
p < .05. As can be seen in Table 4, differences among proso-
cial, individualistic, and competitive participants were small for
a cooperative partner (they all moved to high levels of interde-
pendence) and small for a noncooperative partner (they all
moved to fairly low levels of interdependence). In contrast,
there was a substantial difference between competitors versus
individualists and prosocials for a tit-for-tat partner. Competi-
tors moved to significantly lower levels of interdependence than
did individualists and prosocial individuals. Consistent with
this interpretation, planned comparisons revealed an interaction
of the competitive versus individualistic-prosocial orientation
contrast with the tit-for-tat versus cooperative-noncooperative
partner contrast, F(l, 129) = 8.69, p < .005. None of the three
interactions involving one or both of the other contrasts were
significant. These findings support Hypothesis 4, the prediction
that, relative to prosocials and individualists, competitors ex-
hibit locomotions to reduced levels of interdependence with a
tit-for-tat partner, rather than a cooperative or a noncooperative
partner.7
Functioning: Participant's Outcomes and
Collective Outcomes
As measures of individual and collective functioning, we exam-
ined the number of points accumulated by the self (i.e., partici-
pant's outcomes) and the number of points accumulated jointly by
the self and partner (i.e., collective outcomes).8 Relevant to par-
ticipant's outcomes and collective outcomes, we conducted two 3
(social value orientation) by 2 (partner's locomotion) by 3 (part-
ner's strategy) by 4 (blocks of trials) ANOVAs with the latter two
variables being within-subject variables. For both participant's
outcomes and collective outcomes, we found some evidence of an
interaction of social value orientation and partner's strategy, F(4,
258) = \.91,p< .10, and F(4, 258) = 2.41,p < .05, respectively.
Consistent with Hypothesis 5, Table 5 reveals that, relative to
competitors' outcomes, prosocials and individualists' outcomes
were greater when interacting with a tit-for-tat partner, whereas
such differences between competitors versus prosocials and indi-
6 The analysis yielded several other effects, including an interaction of
partner's strategy and partner's locomotion, F(2, 128) = 3.62, p < .05,
which revealed that partner's locomotions to high (versus low) interdepen-
dence amplify the effects of partner's strategy. Also, we obtained several
effects of blocks of trials, indicating that locomotion to high interdepen-
dence by noncooperative partners fairly rapidly elicits low levels of coop-
eration, whereas locomotion to high interdependence by cooperative and
tit-for-tat partners gradually elicits greater cooperation. Such effects were
less pronounced for partners moving to low interdependence.
7 The analysis did not reveal a main effect of social value orientation but did
reveal an interaction of partner's locomotion and social value orientation, F(2,
129) = 5.66, p < .005. This effect indicated that prosocials and individualists
tended to "match" the partner's locomotion to high interdependence, whereas
competitors tended to mismatch the partner's locomotion to high interdepen-
dence. Perhaps, competitors felt relatively more ambivalent about partner's
locomotions to high interdependence, having insufficient faith in partner's
willingness to make cooperative choices. The analysis also revealed two
effects involving blocks of trials: a main effect for blocks of trials, F(i,
127) = 4.51, p < .005, and an interaction of block of trials and partner's
strategy, F(6, 124) = 4.50, p < .001. Generally, these findings revealed that
across the four blocks, participants moved to lower levels of interdependence,
a decline that was elicited only by a noncooperative partner and not by a
cooperative partner or a tit-for-tat partner.
s Relevant to the logic that participant's functioning and collective
functioning are determined by one's own and one's partner's cooperative
choices and locomotion to varying levels of interdependence, we computed
links among several variables, thereby collapsing across the four blocks of
trials, partner's locomotions, and social value orientation. For cooperative
partners, tit-for-tat partners, and noncooperative partners, there were sig-
nificant correlations between (a) cooperation and locomotion to enhanced
interdependence, rs(135) = .66, .68, and .41, respectively; (b) cooperation
and participant's functioning, rs(135) = - .76, .91, and .92, respectively;
(c) cooperation and collective functioning, /-s(135) = .83, .93, and .56,
respectively; (d) locomotion to enhanced interdependence and participant's
functioning, rs(135) = —.38, .65, and —.69, respectively; and (e) locomo-
tion to enhanced interdependence and collective functioning, rs(l35) =
.66, .65, and —.46, respectively (for all the above correlations, p < .001).
Subsequent simultaneous regression analyses revealed that both coopera-
tion and locomotion to enhanced interdependence made significant, unique
contributions to predicting participant's functioning and collective func-
tioning, for both cooperative partners and noncooperative partners. For
tit-for-tat partners, locomotion did not significantly contribute above and
beyond cooperation to predicting participant's and collective functioning.
Indeed, cooperation and participant's and collective functioning were
highly correlated for tit-for-tat partners, because cooperation elicits mutual
cooperation and noncooperation elicits mutual noncooperation. Therefore,
own cooperation accounts for most of the variance in functioning (in this
case, more than 80% of the variance), and hence, there is not much
variance left to be accounted for by locomotion to varying levels of
interdependence. Taken together, these findings provide support for the
claim that cooperation and locomotion account for participant's function-
ing and collective functioning.
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Table 5
Participant Outcomes, Collective Outcomes, Partner's
Outcomes, and Equality in Outcomes as a Function of










































































Note. Equality in outcomes was calculated by determining the difference
between participant's outcomes and partner's outcomes; thus, greater (ab-
solute) means reflect less equality in outcomes.
vidualists were substantially smaller when interacting with a co-
operative or noncooperative partner. Consistent with Hypothesis 6,
Table 5 reveals that, relative to competitors, collective outcomes
obtained by prosocials and individualists were greater when inter-
acting with a tit-for-tat partner, whereas such differences between
competitors versus individualists and prosocials were substantially
smaller when interacting with a cooperative or noncooperative
partner. These conclusions are supported by planned comparisons,
revealing an interaction of the competitive versus individual-
istic-prosocial orientation contrast with the tit-for-tat versus
cooperative-noncooperative partner contrast, both for participant's
outcomes, F(l, 129) = 7.49,/? < .01, and for collective outcomes,
F(l, 129) = 6.71, p < .01. None of the other three interactions
involving one or both other contrasts were significant.910
Discussion
Consistent with our framework for understanding social inter-
action and the concept of locomotion, the present research reveals
strong evidence that partner's strategy and social value orientation
exert a strong impact on both cooperation and locomotion to
varying levels of interdependence. In the following paragraphs, we
consider the major findings and outline several implications.
First, the present findings revealed that, relative to cooperative
and tit-for-tat partners, a noncooperative partner elicited less co-
operation (in support of Hypothesis 1), and locomotion to lower
levels of interdependence (in support of Hypothesis 3). These
findings support the more general claim that partner's strategy
elicits more "forces" (cf. Lewin, 1936/1966) than simply cooper-
ation versus noncooperation. Disregarding social value orientation,
participants moved to high levels of interdependence (approach)
when interacting with a cooperative or tit-for-tat partner and
moved to low levels of interdependence (avoidance) when inter-
acting with a noncooperative partner. This finding is important,
because the extant literature tends to provide only part of the story:
Most people cooperate with tit-for-tat partners, somewhat fewer
people cooperate with cooperative partners, and virtually nobody
cooperates with noncooperative partners. It is plausible that when
confronted with noncooperative others, the primary response of
most people may be to avoid such others rather than to make
9 The analyses revealed several other findings for participant's outcomes
and collective outcomes, including main effects of partner's strategy,
respective Fs(2, 128) = 905.34 and 650.57. p < .001, and partner's
locomotion, respective Fs(l, 129) = 33.16 and 11.60, p < .001, and an
interaction of partner's locomotion by partner's strategy, respective Fs(2,
128) = 6.42 and 27.83, p < .001. It is noteworthy that, relative to a
tit-for-tat partner (M = 19.02), a cooperative partner (M = 35.09) yielded
greater collective outcomes (see Table 5) and that, on average, partner's
locomotions to low versus high levels of interdependence amplified the
effects of partner's strategy on participant's outcomes and collective out-
comes, at least for cooperative partners and tit-for-tat partners. There were
no effects of social value orientation, except for a main effect of social
value orientation on collective outcomes, F(2, 129) = 4.26, p < .05.
Overall, the collective outcomes obtained by competitors were lower than
those of prosocials and individualists (see Table 5). Finally, we obtained
several effects involving blocks of trials, for participant's outcomes, part-
ner's outcomes, and collective outcomes. The means associated with the
interactions with blocks of trials revealed patterns that were quite similar to
those obtained for cooperation.
10 In a more exploratory vein, we examined partner's outcomes, using
the same analyses as for participant's and collective outcomes. A main
effect of social value orientation, F(l, 129) = 3.73, p < .05, revealed that
partner's outcomes were lower when interacting with competitors, rather
than prosocials or individualists (see Table 5). A main effect for partner's
strategy, F(2, 128) = 65.07, p < .001, and an interaction of partner's
strategy and partner's locomotion, F(2, 258) = 9.35, p < .001, revealed the
following pattern. Generally, a tit-for-tat partner yielded the best outcomes
(M = 9.05), followed by a cooperative partner (M = 1.32), and a nonco-
operative partner yielded the worst outcomes (M = —8.67). This effect for
tit-for-tat versus cooperative versus noncooperative partners was stronger
for partners locomoting to high interdependence (A/s = 12.85 vs. 8.04 vs.
-10.82, respectively) than for partners locomoting to low interdependence
(Ms = 4.95 vs. -5.91 vs. -6.35, respectively). Given that tit for tat yielded
greater outcomes than cooperative or noncooperative partners, and given
that tit for tat has received considerable attention as a functional strategy,
it is interesting to note that in social dilemmas in which locomotion is
possible, tit for tat can do even better if this strategy is accompanied by
locomotions to high interdependence rather than low interdependence.
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self-centered choices at the expense of others or to become moti-
vated to compete. An interaction-relevant implication of this rea-
soning is that the resultant pattern of "noncooperative" interaction
may be in fact less costly to both individuals than one might infer
from the extant literature on cooperation and competition. Indeed,
reducing levels of interdependence is an effective means to min-
imizing the costs (for self and the collective) following from an
interdependent other's noncooperative actions.
Second, the present findings revealed that the effect of partner's
strategy was moderated by individuals' social value orientation.
Relative to prosocials and individualists, competitors exhibited
lower levels of cooperation when interacting with a tit-for-tat
partner (and to a lesser extent, when interacting with a cooperative
partner). In contrast, there were virtually no differences between
prosocials and individualists versus competitors when interacting
with a noncooperative partner. These findings are consistent with
Hypothesis 2 (except that we expected somewhat more substantial
differences between prosocials and individualists vs. competitors
when paired with a cooperative partner). More important, parallel
findings were obtained for locomotions to varying levels of inter-
dependence: Relative to prosocials and individualists, competitors
exhibited locomotions to reduced interdependence with a tit-for-tat
partner. This finding provides good support for Hypothesis 4.
What might be the mechanisms that lead competitors "to move
away" from partners pursuing tit for tat?
As suggested earlier, a plausible interpretation is that by virtue
of the interactive features of tit for tat, competitors will never be
able to accomplish their primary interaction goals (i.e., maximi-
zation of relative advantage). Tit for tat is simply unexploitable
(except for the very first trial), and thus competitors cannot effec-
tively pursue their primary interaction goals with a tit-for-tat
partner (see Table 1). Although this logic is true by definition, a
more proximal (and highly complementary) account is that the
interaction patterns that competitors elicit from tit for tat (i.e., high
levels of mutual defection) influence their locomotions to low
levels of interdependence.
We regard these findings to be important for at least two
reasons. First, there is a large literature suggesting that tit for tat is
the most effective (or one of the most effective) strategies for
obtaining cooperation, at least in iterated prisoner's dilemmas. The
present research not only supports this claim (i.e., a tit-for-tat
partner yielded greater outcomes than did a cooperative partner;
see Table 5) but also indicates that, when locomotion is possible,
tit for tat may actually have another advantage. It appears to move
away those who seek relative advantage, thus minimizing the costs
associated with probable noncooperative behavior of competitors.
In other words, by virtue of tit for tat's interactive features, an
individual using a tit-for-tat strategy takes care of himself or
herself in a fairly structural manner by moving competitors away.
Assuming that people in real life are often able to move to varying
levels of interdependence (e.g., with colleagues and neighbors), tit
for tat might actually serve two functions: (a) promoting cooper-
ation among those who are willing to do so (even among "ratio-
nally self-interested" individuals), and (b) promoting tendencies of
avoidance among those who are unwilling to cooperate (among
competitively oriented individuals). These functions tend to serve
the long-term outcomes of the individual who adopts tit for tat, as
well as the joint outcomes of the two persons involved.
These insights are relevant not only to individuals holding
competitive orientations but also to interactions in which one or
both individuals are oriented toward enhancing relative advantage
over others (e.g., through circumstances that foster competition).
For example, these findings may contribute to explaining the
discontinuity effect, the finding that intergroup interactions are less
cooperative than interindividual interactions in situations charac-
terized by a moderate conflict of interests (for a recent overview,
see Insko & Schopler, 1998). If groups are on average more
individualistically oriented than are individuals, then tit for tat
should elicit high cooperation and locomotion to high interdepen-
dence in the other group. However, if groups are on average more
competitively oriented, then tit for tat should elicit noncooperation
and locomotion to low levels of interdependence.
Second, at the same time, we have seen that cooperative partners
actually elicited a fair amount of cooperation, even more cooper-
ation than did tit-for-tat partners. In a parallel manner, cooperative
partners yielded greater collective outcomes (albeit distributed
unequally; see Table 5) than did tit-for-tat partners. Thus, Axel-
rod's (1984) assertion that tit for tat and related strategies "might
be too competitive for their own good" (Axelrod, 1984, p. 40) may
actually be read as "might be too competitive for the collective
good," at least when locomotions to varying levels of interdepen-
dence are possible. The mere fact that the interdependent other has
some power might be sufficient to induce a fair amount of coop-
eration, even among competitors. One might speculate that in
real-life interactions, it may be functional, at least from a collective
point of view, to adopt a generous version of tit for tat, in which
"bookkeeping" is somewhat less central and communicating trust
and benevolence is somewhat more central.
We close by briefly outlining some strengths and limitations of
this research. Some limitations derive from the fact that we did not
directly compare the effects of locomotion availability (see Foot-
note 2) and that we addressed only one form of locomotion (i.e.,
locomotion to varying degrees of interdependence), which was
examined in a turn-taking, unilateral manner (i.e., the partner and
participant took turns, and that had unilateral control over each
locomotion). Indeed, locomotion could also take the form by
which both partners simultaneously determine their actual loco-
motions. We regard this latter issue to be an interesting topic for
future research, as it seems plausible that locomotion in real life is
often determined in a disjunctive or conjunctive manner (whereby
locomotion is determined by the individual who wishes to move to
the lowest or highest level of interdependence), rather than in an
independent manner. At the same time, the findings provide good
support for our framework, which we interpret as good evidence
for the validity of the new paradigm for studying locomotion in
social dilemmas.
We suggest that the fields of interdependence, cooperation and
competition, and social decision making might benefit consider-
ably from attempts to extend the traditional experimental game
paradigm to more dynamic paradigms (see also Murnighan, 1991;
Nowak, Vallacher, & Lewenstein, 1994). Indeed, the availability
of a broader response repertoire may enhance not only the eco-
logical validity of the experimental game paradigm but also our
knowledge of the interpersonal dynamics relevant to understand-
ing the functioning of dyads and groups.
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It is plausible that functional adaptations to interdependence
problems are more easily detected than the extant literature of
cooperation and competition suggests, in part because this litera-
ture (based on at least 50 years of research) has largely overlooked
possibilities for locomotion. Individuals adapt to interdependence
situations in multifaceted ways, and one might speculate that social
interactions often are quite harmonious, cooperative, and gratify-
ing (although the conflictual ones are likely to be more salient and
memorable) because individuals often have the option to locomote.
The mere availability of locomotion to varying levels of interde-
pendence might bring about good outcomes for both, and the
actual use of locomotion allows individuals to shape one another's
behavior more effectively, so that—at the very least—exception-
ally poor outcomes for the dyad or group as a whole can often be
prevented.
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